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I. INTRODUCTION
On Easter Sunday of 2008, as other members of the Unleavened
Bread Ministries gathered to pray and to celebrate Christ's resurrection,
Dale and Leilani Neumann sat by their eleven-year-old daughter's
bedside, praying for a different kind of miracle.1  Madeline Kara
Neumann had slipped into a coma, a result of what medical authorities
now know to be diabetic ketoacidosis-a serious, life threatening
complication if left untreated. 2 Kara, as she was known to her friends
and family in the small, rural town of Weston, Wisconsin, suffered from
undiagnosed Type I diabetes, which could have been managed by simple
insulin therapy. 3 Kara was not given insulin, nor taken to a doctor, even
as she slipped into a coma.4
The Neumanns are followers of the Unleavened Bread Ministries, a
largely internet-based Christian sect, 5 whose tenets include the rejection
of conventional medical treatment in favor of faith-based spiritual
healing. 6 Charged with second-degree reckless homicide,7 the Neumanns
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Richmond: T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., 2007, Wake
Forest University.
1. Suzanne Sataline, A Child's Death anda Crisis for Faith, WALL ST. J., Jun. 12, 2008, at D1; David
Schoetz, Parents' Faith Fails to Save Diabetic Girl, ABCNEwS.COM, Mar. 27, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.comlHealth/DiabetesResource/Story?id=4536593&page=l (last visited Nov. 22,
2008).
2. Sataline, supra note 1; Schoetz, supra note 1.
3. Schoetz, supra note 1; see Janet M. Torpy, Type I Diabetes, 298 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1472, 1472
(2007), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/ ful/298/12/1472.
4. Schoetz, supra note 1.
5. See id.; Unleavened Bread Ministries, http://www.unleavenedbreadministries.org (last visited Nov.
22, 2008).
6. Press Release, David Ellis, Press Release from Unleavened Bread Ministries Regarding the Death
of 11 Year-Old Madeline Kara Neumann (Mar. 27, 2008), available at
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have now placed their faith, not in spiritual healing, but in a spiritual
healing exemption to Wisconsin's child abuse statute.8 The exemption
provides that "[a] person is not guilty of an offense . . . solely because
he or she provides a child with treatment by spiritual means through
prayer alone for healing. . .. "
Exemptions, like the one found in the Wisconsin statute, are not rare.
Indeed, with forty-five states having "some legal accommodations in
child-protection laws for parents who use spiritual healing," 10 the
Wisconsin statute is indicative of the wave of spiritual exemption
statutes that followed on the heels of the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act ("CAPTA") of 1974.11
Motivated by the desire to slow the tide of abuse and neglect related
deaths in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and recognizing a need "to
provide financial assistance . . . for the prevention, identification, and
treatment of child abuse and neglect," 12 Congress passed CAPTA in
1974.13 The bill was designed, among other things, to provide monetary
incentives for states to create similar statutory measures, yet heavy
lobbying by religious groups, such as the Christian Scientists, 14 compelled
the bill's framers to include a spiritual exemption clause.15  The
gravamen of the clause was articulated in the House Report that
accompanied the bill, which stated that "no parent or guardian who in
good faith is providing to a child treatment solely by spiritual means-
such as prayer-according to the tenets and practices of a recognized
church through a duly accredited practitioner shall for that reason alone
be considered to have neglected the child. '16
Such state spiritual exemption clauses, whose passage was monetarily
rewarded through CAPTA funding, allow religious parents and faith-
healers to escape criminal prosecution if their child was injured or died
http://www.unleavenedbreadministries.org/?=pressrelease ("We are not commended in scripture to
send people to the doctor but to meet their needs through prayer and faith. As anyone here will tell
you, we are not against doctors for those we have their faith there and never condemn or restrict them
in any way. But we know that the best one to trust in for healing is Jesus Christ.").
7. Sataline, supra note 1.
8. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(6) (West 1996).
9. Id.
10. Sataline, supra note 1.
11. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (2000)).
12. H.R. REP. 93-685, at 1 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2763-64.
13. Pub. L. No. 93-685, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107).
14. See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
15. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(d)(ii) (2007).
16. H.R. REP. 93-685, at 3, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767.
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because the parents relied on spiritual healing in lieu of requisite
conventional medical attention. In a twenty-year period following the
passage of CAPTA, and the subsequent passage of state-by-state religious
exemptions, an empirical study noted that an estimated 172 children
have died as a result of the faith-based denial of medical care.17
Since the end of the nineteenth century, courts in England and
America have wrestled with the delicate balance between church and
state as it concerns the health and welfare of children whose parents, on
religious grounds, elect to reject life saving medical care. 18 Although
American parents have the constitutional right to freely practice their
religion, afforded to them by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, 19  "the constitutional protection accorded to religious
beliefs does not extend to practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the state, which has a recognized interest in protecting the lives and
health of its children. '20
Although an incredibly complex and important issue concerning
national interests, the Supreme Court of the United States has not
directly addressed spiritual exemptions to state child protection
statutes. 21 This lack of attention is increasingly troublesome, as more
and more of the highest state courts are faced with questions of the
constitutionality of spiritual exemption statutes. 22 Although some state
supreme courts have held that the state's interest, as parens patriae, to
17. Richard A. Hughes, The Death of Children by Faith-Based Medical Neglect, 20 J.L. & RELIGION
247, 247 (2004) (citing Seth Asser & Rita Swan, Child Fatalities From Religion-Motivated Medical
Neglect, 101 PEDIATRICS 625, 625-29 (1998)). Dr. Asser is a professor of pediatric medicine at the
University of California, San Diego, School of Medicine, and Dr. Swan is the founder of Child
Healthcare is a Legal Duty (CHILD), as well as a former Christian Scientist, whose son died as a
result of the failure of spiritual healing intervention. See Asser & Swan, supra, at 625.
18. Compare Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (stating "that the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and
that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction"), People v. Pierson,
68 N.E. 243, 247 (N.Y. 1903) (Cullen, J., concurring) (upholding a conviction of misdemeanor child
neglect and stating, "The state, as parens patriae, is authortized to legislate for the protection of
children"), Regina v. Senior, 19 Cox Crim. Cas. 219, 224 (1898) (U.K.) (affirming a manslaughter
conviction for a parent who denied his child medical care, which resulted in the child's death), and
Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 111, 115 (1875) (U.K.) (holding that parents who deny medical
attention to their sick child, even when based on religious beliefs, are guilty of manslaughter), with
Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530, 533-34 (1868) (U.K.) (holding that parents who deny
medical attention to their child based on firmly held religious beliefs were not guilty of homicide).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Baruch Gitlin, Annotation, Parents' Criminal Liability for Failure to Provide Medical Attention to
Their Children, 118 A.L.R.5th 253,272 (2004).
21. Paula Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between
Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 319, 321 (1991).
22. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
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protect the welfare of children
outweighs the parents' right to freely exercise their religion, a
significant number of states have either not addressed the issue in court
or have, in the alternative, held fast to their spiritual healing
exemptions. 23
This comment examines the historically uncertain balance between an
individual's right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and the state's
countervailing interest to protect the welfare of its youngest and most
vulnerable citizens. By detailing the history of this fragile relationship
through its statutory and judicial renderings, this comment will illustrate
that spiritual exemptions to child protection statutes violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 24 as well as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 and conflict directly
with multiple landmark Supreme Court decisions. 26
II. A HISTORY OF NEGLECT: EARLY BRITISH AND AMERICAN
APPROACHES
In the 1944 Supreme Court decision of Prince v. Massachusetts,27
Justice Rutledge, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that "[t]he
right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child ... to ill health or death .... Parents may be
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free,
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children .... ,,28
Justice Rutledge's words seem unequivocal, yet the fervid debate between
a parent's free exercise of religion in regards to his child's well-being and
the state's vested interest in preserving the life of minor children
continues to this day.
23. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.; see also Children's Healthcare is a Legal Issue,
Religious Exemptions From Healthcare for Children, http://www.childrenshealthcare.org/legal.htm
(last visited Nov. 22,2008) [hereinafter CHILD, Religious Exemptions].
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
26. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. Id. at 166-67, 170.
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Although serving as the foundation for subsequent decisions regarding
a state's interest in safeguarding children's well-being from being
martyred on the altar of their parents' religious beliefs," 29 the Prince
case was by no means the earliest examination of the issue of the death
of a minor due to the denial of medical treatment on religious grounds.
In 1868, an English court, deciding the case of Regina v. Wagstaffe,30
held that parents, who belonged to a religious sect called "The Peculiar
People," reasonably believed that the remedial spiritual treatment of
praying and rubbing oil on the chest of their fourteen-month-old
daughter, 31 who subsequently died of inflamed lungs, would cure her of a
persistent cough.32 Because the child died as a result of the parents'
reliance on their reasonable religious beliefs, and not "any intention to
avoid the performance of their duty," the court dismissed the homicide
charges against the couple. 33
Discouraged by this decision and spurred by public disapproval, the
English Parliament, in the same year as the Wagstaffe decision, passed
the Poor Law Amendment Act ("PLA"), 34 which stated, "When any
Parent shall willfully neglect to provide adequate Food, Clothing,
Medical Aid, or Lodging for his Child . . . whereby the Health of such
Child shall have been... injured, he shall be guilty of an Offense . . .,31
Although Parliament did not directly state that the PLA was in response
to spiritual neglect, the subsequent criminal cases illustrate this end.
In 1875, with deference to the newly enacted PLA, the criminal
courts of England reversed their stance on religious-based neglect: "Since
the [passage of section thirty-seven of the PLA]... it is no answer to the
charge of manslaughter that the parent so neglected from a
conscientious religious belief that it was wrong to call in medical aid...
and not from any intention to disobey the law."'36  The opinion
expresses the view that but for the new Act, the court would have
29. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 319.
30. 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868) (U.K.).
31. The justification for such spiritual healing techniques, cited by most spiritual healers, including
Christian Scientists, is taught in the Epistle of James, 5:14-15, which says, "Is any one of you sick? He
should call the elders of the church to pray over him and anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord.
And the prayer offered in faith will make the sick person well; the Lord will raise him up .... (New
International Version).
32. Wagstaffe, 10 CoxCrim. Cas. at 531.
33. Id. at 530.
34. Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vie. c. 122, § 37 (Eng.).
35. Id.
36. Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 111, 111 (1875) (U.K.).
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decided Downes as they had decided Wagstaffe.37
Nearly contemporaneous with the decision of Downes in England, the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of Reynolds v. United
States.38  Although it was not a response to the PLA or Downes,
Reynolds became one of the first examinations of the conflict between
federal criminal regulations and the free exercise of an individual's
religion.
Reynolds, a Mormon and a polygamist, was arrested and charged with
violating the federal prohibition on bigamous marriages. 39 The Court
was faced with the question of whether the Establishment Clause
protected Reynolds, whose polygamous practices were part and parcel of
his religious beliefs.40 The Court refused to introduce a new element into
criminal law: the exception of persons, who, on the genuine basis of
their religious beliefs, willfully violate criminal law.41
Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the Court stated "[f]aws
are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. 4 2 The
opinion went further, glibly addressing martyrdom in much the same way
that Justice Rutledge did in his Prince decision:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary
part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that
the civil government under which he lived could not interfere
to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was
her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead
husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil
government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?4 3
The Court answered the question of martyrdom in the affirmative:
37. Id. at 114-15.
38. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
39. Id. at 146. The statute read:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether married or single, in a
Territory, or other place over which the United States have [sic] exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of
bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term not
more than five years.
Id. (quoting REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES § 5352 (1874)).
40. Id. at 166.
41. Id. (stating, "[T]he only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of
their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make
polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must
be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law.").
42. Id.
43. Id.
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"To permit [excusing a man's criminal practices because of his religious
belief] would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under
such circumstances. 4 4  Although the decision in Reynolds was not
dispositive on the issue of criminal neglect, vis-A-vis spiritual healing,
many of the core concepts translate into the debate sparked by
Down es.45
Indeed, if Wagstaffe and Downes sparked the American debate, the fire
found fuel with the 1903 decision in People v. Pierson.4 6 The details of
the case tragically mirrored those of Wagstaffe and Downes: an infant
died of pneumonia due to the denial of conventional medical care, based
upon the father's belief in the teachings of the Christian Catholic
Church of Chicago.4 7 Although the faith of the parent was different
than that of the parents in Wagstaffe and Downes, the Court of Appeals
of New York nonetheless held the father criminally liable for the death
of his daughter.4 8 The court held:
A person cannot, under the guise of religious belief, practice
polygamy, and still be protected from our statutes constituting
the crime of bigamy. He cannot, under the belief or
profession of belief that he should be relieved from the care of
children, be excused from punishment for slaying those who
have been born to him.4 9
Fearing that the court's language parsed words, Justice Haight's
opinion went on to state:
[T]he law of nature, as well as the common law, devolves
upon the parents the duty... of doing whatever may be
necessary for their [children's] care, maintenance, and
preservation, including medical attendance, if necessary; and
an omission to do this is a public wrong, which the state, under
44. Id. at 167.
45. The Court, though not acknowledging Downes, cited Wagstaffe as standing for the proposition that
an omission of care is excusable, whilst a positive neglectful act is punishable. Id. The Reynolds
Court stated:
[T]he parents of a sick child, who omitted to call in medical attendance because of their religious
belief that what they did for its cure would be effective, were held not to be guilty of manslaughter...
• But when the offence consists of a positive act which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous to
hold that the offender might escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had
broken ought never to have been made.
Id. (distinguishing the omission of care in Wagstaffe from the positive neglectful act in Reynolds).
46. 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
47. Id. at 244.
48. Id. at 247.
49. Id. at 246.
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its police powers, may prevent.5 0
III. THE ADVENT OF CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS
The Pierson decision sounded a death knell to many faith healers, as
it effectively stated that "the courts had moved toward the opinion that
parents broke the law when they did not provide medical care for their
children," 1 despite religious beliefs. With Mary Baker Eddy's formation
of the Christian Science Church in 1879, the question of proper medical
care shifted from that of omission to that of adequacy.5 2
While spiritual-based neglect seemed clearly anathema to core state
interests under the Downes-Pierson doctrine, after the formation and
staunch lobbying of Christian Scientists, such neglect has gained a
penumbra of ambiguity that kindles the ongoing legal debate, even
today. Though strikingly and tragically similar to the tenets of the
Peculiar People, 3 the Christian Catholic Church of Chicago, 4 and even
the Unleavened Bread Ministries,55 the spiritual healing beliefs of
Christian Scientists do not challenge the necessity of medical attention,
but the very definition thereof.56
Following directly on the heels of Pierson came People v. Quimby,57
which was one of the first in a long line of cases where Christian
Scientists stood accused of failing to furnish a child with any medical
attendance.5 8 Antithetical to Pierson, however, the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court in Quimby found that John Quimby's
treatment of his daughter's diphtheria by spiritual means alone satisfied
the very statute whose standards Pierson's identical treatment had not
met. 9 Although a grand jury returned indictments on two Christian
50. Id. at 246-47.
51. SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH HEALING, CHILDREN, AND THE LAW 96
(2008) (quoting RENNIE B. SCHOEPFLIN, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE ON TRIAL: RELIGIOUS HEALING IN
AMERICA 189 (2002)).
52. See id. at 92, 96.
53. See Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 111 (1875); Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox Crim. Cas.
531 (1868).
54. See Pierson, 68 N.E. at 244.
55. See Schoetz, supra note 1.
56. PETERS, supra note 51, at 96.
57. 99 N.Y.S. 330 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906).
58. Id. at 331.
59. See id.; see also supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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Science practitioners, as well as John Quimby, lobbying by the
coordinated mass of Christian Scientists pressured the appellate court to
dismiss the case with prejudice. 60
As unremarkable as the two page appellate opinion in Quimby seems,
the court disregarded, without hesitation, the carefully weighed
arguments in Downes, Reynolds, and Pierson concerning the balance
between the protections afforded to faith healers under the
Establishment Clause and the state's intervening, superseding role as
parens patriae to protect the welfare of its children.61 It would take
sixty years until this incongruous standard of
the adequacy of faith healing would be codified, 62 all the while going
through inexplicable waves of dismissals and convictions, 63 under
seemingly identical circumstances.
IV. THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
The United States Congress, in order to heighten state standards of
enforcement for child protection laws, passed CAPTA with its now
infamous spiritual healing exemption. 64 Before CAPTA, state child
neglect statutes included, almost universally, the concept that a parent's
denial of reasonable medical treatment to a minor child was a punishable
offense. 65 Since CAPTA, this has changed: "[a]lthough [CAPTA] does
not require states to have a faith healing exemption, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") promulgated regulations that
require states to enact such an exemption to be eligible for federal
funding of child protection programs. ' 66 There is mass speculation that
Congress added the spiritual healing exemption to CAPTA because of
incredibly persistent lobbying efforts by Christian Scientists, including
60. See PETERS, supra note 51, at 94-95.
61. See Quimby, 99 N.Y.S. at 330-31.
62. See infra Part IV.
63. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
64. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (2000)).
65. Cf Hughes, supra note 17, at 248.
66. Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect
of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 59
(1994).
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two members of President Nixon's cabinet, John Ehrlichman and H.R.
Haldeman, who were prominent Christian Scientists. 6'
CAPTA's spiritual exemption clause allows a parent or legal guardian
to refrain from "provid[ing] a child any medical service or treatment
against the religious beliefs of the parent or legal guardian. '68  This
clause was the feather in the cap for many religious lobbyists, and a
thorn in the side of state legislatures and judges who were now faced with
a potential equal protection nightmare. The statute, however, provides
an outlet for judicial interaction, with the provision granting "the
State... the authority to initiate legal proceedings.., to provide medical
care or treatment for a child when such care or treatment is necessary..
"69
Buoyed by Christian Science lobbyists, the HEW interpreted this
exemption broadly and inextricably linked the adoption of such spiritual
exemptions to state eligibility for federal funds for child protection
programs. 70 By 1990, forty-seven states exempted faith healers from
criminal liability, 71 even though the Department of Health and Human
Services removed the requirement in 1983 that each state legislature
pass faith healing exemptions to receive federal child abuse prevention
funding.72
Due to the rise in the number of child neglect related deaths in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress re-examined CAPTA in 1995. 73 A
Senate report following the 1996 amendments to the Act stated the
amendments sought to "clarify that a State's child protection system
should be structured so as to ensure that the State is able to prevent the
withholding of medically indicated treatment from children with life
67. Id. at 59-60 n.82.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 5106i(a) (2000).
69. Id. § 5106i(b).
70. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 331.
71. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(d) (2008);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
46-1-4(c) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6(1)(d) (West 2003 & Supp.
2008); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 4010 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c)(5) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-21-105(0(i) (West 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.5085 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (West 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15
(Consol. 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (2006); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-314, -371. 1(c) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (2007).
72. See Monopoli, supra note 21, at 331.
73. S. REP. NO. 104-117, at 1 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490.
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threatening conditions ... and in cases where the child is in jeopardy of
serious harm.' 74  The report further stated that although the
enforcement of current state faith healing exemptions was up to the
discretion of each individual state, the Senate nevertheless encouraged
each state to take a more proactive approach to prevent death or
serious injuries due to the denial of potentially lifesaving medical
attention by faith based healers. 75 Although no longer an eligibility
requirement for funding, the language of the revised statute still permits
state enacted spiritual exemption statutes. 76
As a result of the 1996 amendments to CAPTA, the language of
section 5106(i)(b) codified Justice Rutledge's sentiments in Prince,
stating:
A] State shall, at a minimum, have in place authority under
ate law to permit [state authorities] to pursue any legal
remedies,... to initiate legalproceedings... , to provide medical
care or treatment for a child when such care or treatment is
necessary... to prevent the withholding of medically indicated
treatment from children with life threatening conditions. 77
Taken together, Code sections 5106(i)(a) and 5106(i)(b) illustrate the
legislature's unwillingness to declare spiritual exemptions
unconstitutional, while realizing that certain government intervention is
necessary to provide for the health and welfare of children.
Although nearly every state still maintains a spiritual exemption
clause within their child protection statutes, 78 in the wake of the
CAPTA amendments and the continued deaths of children denied
medical care, which was supported by strict adherence to the Act's
language, there has been a slow, but growing trend among some states to
amend the spiritual exemption statutes to include more explicit
language. 79 Many of these newly revised statutes do not eliminate the
spiritual exemption, but instead, by clarifying that the exemption does
not apply when the life of a child is threatened, they encourage
74. Id. at 19, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3508.
75. Id. at 19-20, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3508-09.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(i)(a) (2000); Hughes, supra note 17, at 248.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(i)(b).
78. Shelli Dawn Robinson, Commentary, Commonwealth v. Twitchell: Who Owns the Child?, 7 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 413,420 n. 44 (1991).
79. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103(1) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852(C) (2002 & Supp.
2009).
20091
150 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. 12:12 9
government intervention when the child's life is threatened.80 Despite
the progress of these state statutes, confusion still remains as to the
scope and constitutionality of spiritual healing exemptions, creating a
due process trap, which the state supreme courts have been forced to
reconcile since 1974.81
V. WHEN FAITH HEALING BECOMES A CRIME: MODERN JUDICIAL
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE AMBIGUITIES OF SPIRITUAL HEALING
EXEMPTIONS
It could be argued that the 1944 decision in Prince v. Massachusetts,
which declared unconstitutional the martyrdom of children to their
parents' religious beliefs, 82 created the foundation for further spiritual
healing cases. But subsequent decisions by the highest state courts, as
well as the passage of CAPTA's spiritual healing exemption, illustrate
that when an issue arises, particularly one as sensitive as the conflict
between church and state, the outcome is never so black and white.
Even in the early English cases, before the passage of the Poor Law
Amendment Act, there was little continuity, and because no firm
common law doctrine 83 or statutory doctrine 84 was established, the
ambiguity of the interpretation of "spiritual exemptions" remained a
danger to child welfare.
As shown in Part II, the prosecutorial history of faith healing is
seemingly and inexplicably bifurcated, yet courts are reticent to adopt a
solution that protects both the free exercise of religion and the due
process of both parents and infants. Whether on account of lobbying by
Christian Scientists or complicated state statutory schemes, which
protect a parent from liability for the faith-based omission of medical
care in one instance while subjecting them to liability for another,
modern state courts have liberally interpreted the legality and
constitutionality of spiritual healing exemptions. 85
80. See Elizabeth A. Lingle, Comment, Treating Children by Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17
J. LEGAL MED. 301,316 (1996).
81. See infra Part V.
82. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 319.
83. See generally Regina v. Downes, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 111, 113-16 (1875) (U.K.) (mentioning three
other similar cases decided at that time and revealing how those cases had not been determined or
used as persuasive precedent).
84. See generally Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530, 530-32 (1868) (U.K.) (resolving the
case without any statutory provisions).
85. See PETERS, supra note 51, at 116-18.
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In 1988, the California Supreme Court was faced with its first
prosecution of a Christian Science parent for child neglect since 1902.86
In Walker v. Superior Court,87 the court denied Walker's motion to
dismiss, citing Prince v. Massachusetts among other cases. 88 In what
would become a trend of leniency, Walker pled guilty and was assessed a
fine of three hundred dollars, a term of probation, and community
service. 89 Though an undoubtedly lenient punishment, for what would
have amounted to a felony manslaughter charge if convicted, the Walker
case set into motion a number of similar California cases, which spurred
other state prosecutors brazenly to do what had rarely been done in close
to a century: prosecute Christian Scientists.9"
In Commonwealth v. Twitchell,91 the defendants' two-year-old son,
Robyn, died of a bowel obstruction. 92  At trial, the defendants, a
Christian Science couple, relied on the Massachusetts Attorney General's
published interpretation of the state's spiritual exemption statute as
"precluding criminal prosecution of parents for their failure to 'provide
medical care because of religious beliefs.' 93 The Twitchells also relied
on the advice of a Christian Science official, who instructed them that
dependence upon prayer without seeking medical attention was right in
the eyes of the church, as well as in the eyes of the justice system,
insofar as he understood the Attorney General's interpretation of the
law.94
The Church of Christian Science produced a manual entitled, Legal
Rights and Obligations of Christian Scientists in Massachusetts, in which
the Church instructed Massachusetts parents that they will "never suffer
the 'imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent for failure to
provide medical care because of religious beliefs"' because of the spiritual
exemption clause within the Massachusetts child neglect statute. 95
Scholars are quick to point out that both the Attorney General's
86. Id. at 117.
87. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
88. Id. at 869-70, 873.
89. PETERS, supra note 51, at 118.
90. Id.
91. 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993).
92. Id. at 612.
93. Robinson, supra note 78, at 414 n.7 (quoting Maria Chambers, Deliberating Faith, Law, and a Life,
NAT'L L.J., July 2, 1990, at 13); see Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 617-18.
94. See Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 619.
95. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 320 n.3 (referencing CHRISTIAN SCIENCE COMM. ON PUBL'N, LEGAL
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS IN MASSACHUSETTS (1983)); see MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1992 & Supp. 2008).
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interpretation and the subsequent reliance by the Church of Christian
Science were never "authoritatively construed by a court of law" before
they were proffered as evidence in the Twitchell case,96 and therein lies
the problem.
The court remanded the case to a lower court on due process grounds,
but in dicta the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts "conclude[d]
that parents have a duty to seek medical attention for a child" if the
omission of such treatment would reasonably lead to the child's death. 97
Prior to the Twitchell decision, other state courts held that parents had
an affirmative duty to provide their children with lifesaving medical
attention, irrespective of religious beliefs.98 Still, the fundamental due
process problem remained in Twitchell: Should parents be prosecuted for
providing spiritual healing treatment, if they are under the mistaken
belief that the law protects them?
The dissent in Twitchell notes that neither the Attorney General's
interpretation nor the Christian Scientist manual contemplates any
crime other than simple negligence, and that relying on both
interpretations in the defense of a manslaughter charge fails on its face.
99 The due process problem, therefore, arises out of confusion
surrounding the statute's scope. 100 At the conclusion of the inquest into
Robyn Twitchell's death, one justice commented that "[t]o the extent
the local statutes preserve [this] confusion they should be reviewed and
corrected so that all concerned can receive a clear view of their rights
and obligations to replace the hazy one now prevailing." 10 1
The justice's call for legislative reform was echoed in the case of
96. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 320 n.3.
97. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 612.
98. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433, 434-35 (Ind. 1986) (finding parents guilty of reckless
homicide of a dependent when their son died of acute bronchial pneumonia after receiving only
prayer treatment); Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653, 655-56, 660-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
parents guilty of reckless homicide where their nine-month-old daughter died from bacterial
meningitis after receiving solely prayer treatment); Funkhauser v. State, 763 P.2d 695, 696, 699 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988) (finding parents guilty of second degree manslaughter when their three-month-old
son died of pneumonia after receiving only religious methods of healing), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1066
(1989); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding parents guilty of
involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment after their child died from an untreated tumor),
appeal denied, 538 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
99. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 620-21 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
100. See id.
101. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 326 (quoting Just. Rep. on Inquest Relating to the Death of Robyn
Twitchell, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, District Court Department, Suffolk County, Inquest No. 1
of 1986, at 31, 33).
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Hermanson v. State.10 2 As so often occurs in spiritual exemption cases,
the facts of Hermanson mirrored those of Twitchell.1°3 In Hermanson,
the Christian Science parents of a minor diabetic child were convicted of
felony child abuse and third degree murder for failing to provide their
daughter with sufficient medical care. 10 4  The Florida Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the state's spiritual
exemption statutes were "ambiguous and result[ed] in a denial of due
process because the statutes in question fail to give parents notice of the
point at which their reliance on spiritual treatment loses statutory
approval and becomes culpably negligent." 10 5
The Hermanson court further stated that "a person of ordinary
intelligence cannot be expected to understand the extent to which
reliance on spiritual healing is permitted and the point at which this
reliance constitutes a criminal offense under the subject statutes. ' 10 6
Although the court found that Florida's spiritual exemption statutes
were inherently dangerous to the welfare of children, it stopped short of
declaring them unconstitutional, choosing instead to defer the question
of constitutionality to the state legislature. 107  In 1998, the Florida
legislature heeded the court's
advice and repealed the state's spiritual exemption to the child neglect
statute that created the Hermanson due process trap. 108
Various lesser spiritual exemption statutes, however, remain on the
books in Florida, potentially opening the door to another tragic
death. 109
Without considering the ethical or constitutional ramifications of
spiritual healing exemptions, one is forced to examine the number of
children who have, without recompense, lost their lives because of the
sublime ambiguity of the very language of such exemptions. Many
102. 570 So. 2d 322, 327, 332, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (indicating a need for
clarification regarding parental rights when it comes to religion and caring for one's child).
103. Compare id. at 324-27, with Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 612.
104. Hermanson, 570 So. 2d at 324-25. Like Kara Neumann, Amy Hermanson died of diabetic
ketoacidosis. See id.; Satalin, supra note 1.
105. Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 1992).
106. Id.
107. See id. (stating, "The statutes have created a trap that the legislature should address.").
108. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 403 (repealing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503 (West 1996)).
109. CHILD, Religious Exemptions, supra note 23.
20091
154 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. 12:12 9
scholars on both sides of the spiritual exemption issue maintain that
defending such exemptions as unduly ambiguous and confusing is to
engage in a classic due process bait-and-switch,110 especially in light of
recent case law.111
Cases like Twitchell and Hermanson, in which but for the statutory
language the courts would have found the exemption unconstitutional
and the defendants guilty of, at the very least, involuntary manslaughter,
illustrate the need for a more comprehensive, national judicial and
legislative examination of the exemptions' ambiguous nature. 112
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXEMPTIONS
As illustrated, the highest courts in Massachusetts and Florida,
although not explicitly condemning the spiritual healing exemptions as
unconstitutional, did make progress towards the modification of their
states' spiritual healing exemptions. 113 All but extinct are the courts and
legislatures that maintain a view that reliance upon spiritual healing,
even to the point of death or serious injury, is a valid manifestation of
an individual's free exercise of religion. 114 Given the lack of acceptance
of spiritual healing by scholars and members of the judiciary, the total
excusal of guilt in spiritual healing cases has become an aberration. 115
Although spiritual healing exemptions, for the most part, do not give
religious parents carte blanche to impose their religious beliefs upon
their children, certain statutes protecting spiritual healers, only protect
certain recognized religious groups, such as Christian Scientists. 116
Scholars are quick to point out that the favoring of one religion over
another in such statutes is anathema to every major Supreme Court
decision regarding the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses.117
110. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 264.
111. See supra notes 86-109 and accompanying text.
112. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Mass. 1993); Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 776.
113. Cf Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 612; Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 776.
114. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(9) (2006 & Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(4)
(2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-2(d) (LexisNexis 2005).
115. Cf Lingle, supra note 80, at 321-23.
116. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (2007); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-104 (West
2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020 (West Supp. 2008);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 448.03(6), 948.03 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 614.
117. See Monopoli, supra note 21, at 344-45; Lingle, supra note 80, at 320-23.
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In Everson v. Board of Education,118 the Supreme Court held that
government cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another." 119  In Larson v. Valente, 120 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, stated "[t]he clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another."1 21  How, then, can statutes remain
that officially favor one religious denomination over another and, even
more, that de facto favor religious defendants over non-religious ones?
The Supreme Court, in the well known cases of Walz v. Tax
Commission122 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,123 explicitly held that "a statute
violates the establishment clause if it has the effect of fostering an
'excessive government entanglement with religion,' 1 24 and spiritual
exemption statutes have caused such an entanglement since their
popularization in 1974. Nevertheless, few state courts have truly
addressed the constitutionality of these exemptions and, therefore,
continue to maintain such exemptions in their child welfare statutes.1 25
One of the most important Supreme Court cases to deal with the
jeopardization of a child's health or safety based on the parents'
religious beliefs is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 126 in which the Court stated that
"the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim,
may be subject to
limitation .. . if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child .... ,"127 As in Prince, Lemon, and Walz, the
Supreme Court's language in Yoder regards the balance between the
state's interest in preserving child welfare and the free exercise of
religion to be extremely explicit.
Scholars are quick to note that the defendants in Yoder, Amish
parents who did not wish to send their children to public schools,
possessed a firm belief that they would "expose themselves to the danger
118. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
119. Id. at 15.
120. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
121. Id. at 244.
122. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
123. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
124. Lingle,supra note 80, at 318 n.126 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
125. See supra note 98.
126. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
127. Id. at 233-34.
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of the censure of the church community [and] endanger their own
salvation and that of their children," 128 yet the defendants in Twitchell
"did not believe they would have been censured by their church if they
had resorted to conventional medical treatment for their son, nor is
there any indication that they believed their salvation, or their child's,
was jeopardized." 129 Although the religious convictions in Twitchell pale
in comparison to those in Yoder, Florida's spiritual exemption seems to
trump well-trodden Supreme Court precedent, a clear violation of one of
the fundamental tenets of constitutional jurisprudence.
The Amish defendants expressed a deep anxiety that forcing their
children to attend public high schools would lead to an extinction of
traditional Amish communities, yet the Court in Yoder held that the
state's interest in protecting child welfare outweighed the preservation
interest.130 Like the preservation argument in Yoder, Christian
Scientists contend that because faith healing is a leading tenet of the
religion, without it their religion ceases to exist. 131  The diametric
holdings in Yoder and Twitchell arise out of the fundamental
constitutional questions surrounding the implementation and survival of
spiritual healing exemptions.
As one scholar notes, "the underlying law in Yoder and in Twitchell,
by threatening parents with criminal sanctions, affirmatively compels
both sects 'to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets
of their religious beliefs.' ' 132 These acts, nevertheless, are against the
state's countervailing interest to protect child welfare. Moreover, to
compel a state, by means of a spiritual exemption statute, to abrogate its
strong public policy to protect child welfare is not only unconscionable,
but
unconstitutional insofar as the exemption creates a fundamental
Establishment Clause conflict. 133
Whether because of the strong religious lobbying presence in many
state legislatures or merely an unwillingness to strike down statutory law
as unconstitutional, many courts have been unwilling to order the total
128. Id. at 209.
129. Robinson, supra note 78, at 429.
130. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
131. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 339 n. 118.
132. Robinson, supra note 78, at 429-30 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218).
133. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text; cf Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
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repeal of spiritual healing exemptions. 134 In Twitchell, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, though not explicitly declaring the
Massachusetts statute unconstitutional, made positive reference to other
state court holdings, which unequivocally stated that spiritual healing
exemptions were unconstitutional. 135
In Walker, a concurrence noted that not only was the spiritual
treatment provision within the state's child neglect statute a
"constitutional problem," but he went so far as to conclude "that the
California spiritual provision [was] unconstitutional., 136 Likewise, in
the cases of State v. McKown1 37 and State v. Miskimens,138 both of the
states' courts held that spiritual healing exemptions within their child
welfare statutes were unconstitutional. 139
The court in Miskimens stated that spiritual exemption statutes not
only violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, but also
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 140  The
opinion further stated that spiritual exemptions create "one standard of
behavior for parents of one religious belief and another standard for a
different group of parents. It is then inherent that equal protection is
thus being denied to the parents not favored by the special
exemption." 141
The Ohio court, however, did not constrain its analysis of the
unconstitutionality of the state's spiritual exemption statute only to
parental equal protection. 142  Concerning the equal protection of
children whose
parents ascribe to tenets of faith healing, the court found that "if the
real purpose of [child welfare statutes] is to protect children from
parental defalcation, then the [spiritual] exception creates a group of
children who will never be so protected, through no fault or choice of
134. Cf People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. 111, 122-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v.
Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 614 (Mass. 1993); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 68-69 (Minn. 1991).
135. See Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 614-15.
136. Id. at 614 n.5 (citing Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 873-78 (1990) (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
137. 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992).
138. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43 (Corn. P1. 1984).
139. McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 67; Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 47.
140. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 47.
141. Id. at 46; see Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15 (1947).
142. See Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 46.
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their own." 143
Whether the holdings in Miskimen, McKown, and Walker represent a
trend towards the abolition of spiritual healing exemption statutes
remains to be seen, but it is clear that the highest courts of some states,
when explicitly examining the constitutionality of spiritual exemptions,
have determined that such statutes are unconstitutional. 144
VII. FORESTALLING DEATH: A STATE'S RIGHT TO TAKE PROACTIVE
MEASURES
No universal approach to the application or constitutionality of
spiritual healing exemptions exists, and it should therefore come as no
surprise that states lack uniform procedure with which to empower their
courts to seek proactive intervention in situations of spiritual-based
child neglect. Although the 1996 CAPTA amendments provide that the
state, at the very least, have measures in place for government
intervention, the very same amendments provide that the individual
state determine whether spiritual healing is sufficient medical treatment,
which ostensibly would negate the requirement for state medical
intervention. 145
In Miskimens, the Ohio court relied upon the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade146 to illustrate that while there may be
significant personal rights, such as the free exercise of religion, privacy,
and the right to terminate a pregnancy, there are also countervailing
state interests, which may prevail in some circumstances, such as the
welfare of a viable life. 147 The Supreme Court in Roe held that,
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 5106i(a)-(b) (2000). The amendments stated:
Nothing in this subchapter.., shall be construed... to require that a State find, or to prohibit a State
from finding, abuse or neglect in cases in which a parent or legal guardian relies solely or partially
upon spiritual means rather than medical treatment, in accordance with the religious beliefs of the
parent or legal guardian.
Id. § 5016i(a). It further provided:
[A] State shall, at a minimum, have in place authority under State law to permit the child protective
services system of the State to pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, to provide medical care or treatment for a child when
such care or treatment is necessary to prevent or remedy serious harm to the child, or to prevent the
withholding of medically indicated treatment from children with life threatening conditions.
Id. § 5106i(b).
146. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
147. Id. at 163; see Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 46-47. This decision was echoed in the case of
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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although there is a right to personal privacy, "a State may properly
assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical
standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in pregnancy,
these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain
regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision." 148
The court in Miskimens stated, in regards to the Court's contention in
Roe, that "if the highest court in this nation can sanction government
intervention in the parent-child relationship to protect a child whose
chronological age is still a negative number, then surely... the rights of a
[young child] are no less than those of the yet unborn." 149 Because of
this line of reasoning in Miskim ens, some state courts have held that
they are not bound to merely punish parents whose children have died as
a result of failed spiritual healing or other denial of medical attention
based on religious beliefs, but that state courts can intercede and, acting
out of a prevailing state interest, protect the child's welfare. 150
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority,15 1 a
Georgia court ordered a mother to undergo a Cesarean section, which was
against her wishes and religious beliefs, because a failure to undergo the
procedure would result in the fetus' death.15 2  Incongruous with the
Jefferson decision is that of In re Baby Doe,15 3 an Illinois decision
holding that a mother has the right to refuse a Cesarean section, on
religious grounds, even if the fetus may be harmed. 15 4 In re Baby Doe is
a questionable decision based not upon a spiritual healing exemption, but
upon the equally constitutionally aberrant decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Stallman v. Youngquist,1 55 which states that "in
Illinois, a fetus cannot have rights superior to those of its mother. 1 56
The decision in Stallman is clearly at odds with the holding in both
Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 157 and it comes as no surprise that Stallman
148. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
149. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d at 46-47.
150. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 987 P.2d 1060 (Kan. 1999); In re D.R., 20 P.3d 166 (Okla. Civ. App.
2001).
151. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). But see Newark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1109 (Del. 1991).
152. Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 459-60. Ironically, the procedure would have saved the mother's life as
well, but the court focused upon the interest to save the fetus. Id.
153. 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
154. Id. at 326.
155. 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
156. Id. at 359.
157. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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neglects to reference either of these cases.158 However, neither In re
Baby Doe nor Stallman have been followed by subsequent courts. 159
In two separate cases, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson160 and In re Jamaica Hospital,161 Jehovah's
Witness mothers refused to undergo a blood transfusion to save their
viable fetuses on the grounds of religious objections. 162 Both courts,
relying on the holding of Roe, similar to the application in Miskimens,
declared that the state had a prevailing interest and ordered the mothers
to submit to the transfusions. 163 The correlation between the scope of
the state's spiritual exemption statute and the willingness to intervene
before the child suffers irreparable harm is not yet known, as the
aforementioned cases in this section were decided in states that still
maintain spiritual healing exemptions.1 64 Courts are armed both with
the unconstitutionality of spiritual healing statutes themselves, vis-a-vis
the Establishment Clause and Due Process Clause of the Constitution,
and the Roe-Miskimens balancing test of the state's prevailing interest as
parens patriae, against the individual's free exercise of religion. 165 Yet
courts remain, to this day, inconsistent in their application of the law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since Regina v. Downes in 1875, English and American courts have
been faced with the issue of the government's role in regulating religious
practices so far as it relates to the preservation of children's welfare.
However, the Supreme Court has not specifically examined the
constitutionality of these statutes, nor has it granted certiorari to
examine the constitutionality of state courts' applications of these
statutes. 166 Because of the Supreme Court's lack of action, the burden of
158. See Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 356-80.
159. See El-Amin v. Dempsey, 768 N.E.2d 344, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that a cause of
action for the death of a newborn brought on behalf of the mother is not hostile to the mother's rights);
In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that a mother cannot be forced to
accept a blood transfusion for the benefit of her fetus); Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (holding that a parent is not immune from suit brought by a child alleging personal injury
proximately caused by the parent's negligent operation by a car).
160. 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
161. 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
162. Anderson, 201 A.2d at 537; In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
163. Anderson, 201 A.2d at 538; In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900.
164. See CHILD, Religious Exemptions, supra note 23.
165. See supra note 14.
166. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 873 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., concurring); State v.
McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63,69 n.9 (Minn. 1991).
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progress lies with state judges and legislators, and this burden remains a
problem so long as glaring ambiguities and dissimilarities exist in the
uncoordinated examination of the scope and application of spiritual
healing exemptions.
Due to the cloud of confusion surrounding spiritual exemptions,
muddied by strong religious lobbyists, legislators must at the very least
clarify and refine the statutes so as to eliminate a shadow of doubt that
parents will be liable for a child's serious injury or death as a result of
neglect on the grounds of faith healing. Furthermore, the state must
uniformly exert its vested interest, as parens patriae, in the welfare of
the vulnerable children, regardless of the parent's religious objections.
As Robyn Twitchell's death makes clear, "parents are being misled by
the statutory exemptions and ... their children are at risk of injury and
death as a result." 167  Therefore it is up to the state courts and
legislatures to close this due process loophole, which has been the
salvation of many faith healers. 168
Clarification, however, may not be the ultimate solution necessary to
eradicate the potential danger, which arises out of the very nature of
spiritual exemptions. Because faith-based spiritual exemptions violate
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by necessarily, yet
ambiguously, entangling the government in religion, they may in and of
themselves be unconstitutional, and should, in this case, be abolished
entirely.
What remains after analysis and application, is an unfinished chapter
in a tragic story, indicating the delicate but sometimes lopsided balance
between the free exercise of religion and the countervailing state interest
to preserve the lives of children. Without an examination by the
Supreme Court or an unambiguous revocation of the favorable CAPTA
provisions, the issues of constitutionality remain a state-by-state
decision. Given the matrix of the interlocking and often antagonistic
complexities inherent within spiritual exemptions and the historical
landscape of differing viewpoints, no unified national solution seems
imminent. State legislatures and courts, therefore, must be considerate
of the overwhelming constitutional and ethical arguments against
spiritual exemption statutes and proactively seek to protect the welfare
of their youngest citizens.
167. Monopoli, supra note 21, at 326-27.
168. See Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 1992); McKown, 475 S.W.2d at 635; State v.
Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 938 (Com. P1. 1984); cf Walker, 763 P.2d at 852; Commonwealth v.
Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993).
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